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AbstrAct: Based on the construction of a composite index to assess the relative performance of welfare policies, we show that the 
variability of performances cannot be explained only by the amount of resources devoted to social policies, but also by its composition: countries 
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traditional classification of the European welfare systems to the performance obtained in the social sector. 
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iNtrodUctioN
The effectiveness of national social policies in Europe has been the subject of political and theoretical debates in the context of the 
economic crisis, population ageing and intervention at the Union level through the European guidelines (Bouget, 2003; Ferrera, 
2009; Caminada et al., 2010; van Vliet, 2010) as, for example, pension reforms and the extension of the provision of early childhood 
services aimed at reconciling work and family.
The economic literature has associated the type of welfare system with the degree of achievement of policy objectives (Titmuss, 
1974; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Rhodes 1996; Goodin et al, 1999; Bertola et al, 2001; Arts and Gelissen 2002; Zoli 2004; Ferrera, 
1996 and 2012, Ferrera et al, 2000; Hudson and Kuhner, 2012; Joumard et al., 2012; Minas et al., 2014).
Existing contributions, however, mainly perform sectoral analyses. For instance, in the Mediterranean countries, lower social 
expenditure to reconcile work and family is associated with lower female participation in the labour market. However, disaggregated 
analyses cannot provide an assessment of the overall national social policies, since a given sectoral policy can have cross-effects on 
other areas. For instance, a higher expenditure level in the support of families (e.g., childcare) encourages female participation in the 
labour market, and can therefore contribute to reduce poverty and income inequality.
Against this background, the aim of this paper is to construct an aggregate indicator of social protection performance, that 
summarizes the output achieved in all the sectors of social protection, as specified in the OECD Social Expenditure Database 
(SOCX): family, health, labour market, elderly, disabled, unemployment, and inequality; as a second step, we investigate the variables 
that are correlated with the degree of achievement of social objectives, proposing, as an avenue for future research, the analysis of the 
composition of social expenditure as a determinant of the performance of social policy.
For this purpose, we identify the outcome indicators for each area of social expenditure. Then, following the methodology 
proposed by Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) and Afonso et al. (2005, 2006), we construct a composite performance index for the 
social sector and relate it to the net social expenditure (i.e., the social expenditure net of the national fiscal measures as tax levies and 
benefits).
Our analysis shows that the variability of performances cannot be explained only by the amount of resources invested in social 
protection. In other terms, a general strong positive correlation between performance and social expenditure level doesn’t exist. A 
stronger correlation can be identified only for the subgroups of countries.
However, we find some evidence that the performance level can be related to the composition of social expenditure: the countries 
characterized by high shares of public expenditure specifically aimed at reducing the income concentration obtain better overall 
1   M. Alessandra Antonelli: Sapienza University of Rome, School of Law. Email: alessandra.antonelli@uniroma1.it; Valeria De Bonis: Sapienza University of Rome, School of 
Law. E-mail: valeria.debonis@uniroma1.it. We thank the Editor and two anonymous Referees for helpful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply.
21
Cent. Eur. J. Public Policy 2018; 12(1)
DOI: 10.2478/cejpp-2018-0001
2017 licensee De Gruyter Open. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 License.
results in the social sector. A possible explanation is that unless reducing income inequality is the specific objective, some individuals 
are left out, since they are not the target of any other social policy (e.g., old age, disability, family).
As a policy implication, these findings suggest, in general, to take into account not only the dimension, but also the composition 
of social expenditure.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces the data and the framework of the analysis. We proceed by 
describing the outcome indicators adopted for each welfare area. Then, we introduce the method used for calculating the performance 
index and the data concerning net social expenditure. Finally, we analyse the link between social performance and the composition 
of social spending. The last section summarizes the main results of the analysis.
dAtA ANd mEthodologicAl frAmEworK
In the following analysis, we use the OECD Social Expenditure and Eurostat databases (2013) regarding the expenditure side of the 
social systems in 22 European countries (see the Appendix for a detailed description of the sources of data).
Following Adema et al. (1996, 2011, 2014) and in contrast to the prevailing literature, the total public expenditure allocated to 
social purposes is considered also in net terms, that is, net of national fiscal measures as tax levies and benefits, thus representing the 
net – albeit aggregate – benefit that social policies provide for beneficiaries (net public social expenditure in the SOCX Database). In 
this sense, it represents a more appropriate indicator of the intensity of public intervention in the social sector.
Besides the aggregate item, in our analysis, we also consider data for each of the seven subsectors (branches) considered in the 
database (family, health, labour market, the elderly, the unemployed, the disabled, and income maintenance).
According to the welfare literature (see, among others, Bertola et al. 2001), welfare policies aim at three main goals: combating 
social exclusion through the maintenance of a certain standard of living; increasing the remuneration for the participation in the 
labour market through income support for vulnerable groups (the elderly, the unemployed, and the disabled); and reducing income 
inequality. Therefore, we also aggregate the items of each branch according to their prevailing goal2.
Where necessary, for the purposes of international comparison, monetary variables are expressed in purchasing power parity 
(PPP) terms (US dollars).
thE pErformANcE of thE sociAl sEctor: oUtpUt iNdicAtors
In this section, we define the indicators used to construct our social protection performance index (SPPI). The concept of performance 
is a multidimensional concept related to both the efficiency and the effectiveness of social policies, which are themselves dependent 
on many factors and public policies. In this framework, we use the term performance to indicate the output achieved in different 
social areas. Considering the seven sub-sectors of social expenditure (family, health, labour market, elderly, disabled, unemployment, 
inequality), one can distinguish the following outcome indicators.
–	 Maternal employment and net disposable family income for the family sector. Family policies are mainly oriented towards reconciling 
work and family life, and regard the provision of educational and care services for early childhood, parental leave and home care 
for children or the elderly. The main purpose may therefore be identified with encouraging a greater women’s participation in 
the labour market. A further line of intervention regards the granting of tax benefits (deductions and tax credits) or monetary 
transfers to families with children to support their income level and, ultimately, in order not to discourage births. As indicators, 
we have therefore used the maternal employment rate and simulated the net disposable income of a ‘typical’ family, consisting of 
two children and two working parents with, respectively, a gross income from employment equal to 100 percent and 67 percent 
of the average income from employment in their country of residence. The net disposable income is calculated by subtracting the 
income tax (considering deductions or tax credits) and social contributions from gross taxable income (adjusted for deductions) 
and adding monetary benefits. For the simulation analysis the OECD’s tax-benefit calculator model (available at the following 
link: http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefitsandwagestax-benefitcalculator.htm) was used.
2  See Figure 1.
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–	 Life-expectancy for the health sector. According to the prevailing literature (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000, and Afonso et al.,2005, 
2006), we use life-expectancy at birth as the performance indicator of health policies.
–	 The unemployment rate, to assess the performance of active labour market policies, that is, all those initiatives (such as training, 
work-related education, apprenticeships, careers guidance tools, etc.) designed to promote employment and work placement for 
the labour market. To consider various categories of workers, in addition to the overall unemployment rate, we have considered 
unemployment rates for other two aggregates that are often the object of national welfare policies: the female unemployment 
rate, to which reference is frequently made in the European recommendations, and the youth unemployment rate (based on 
the number of people aged 15—24 out of work in relation to the youth workforce) which has been especially affected by the 
economic crisis that has hit the world economy since 2007.
–	 The net replacement rate, that is, the proportion of labour income (net of fiscal measures) that the national welfare systems 
respectively guarantee to the elderly and the unemployed after their exit from the labour market. For each of these categories, 
the indicator that we have identified is the average amount of available resources (that is, net of fiscal measures as direct taxation, 
resulting from social transfers, indirect taxation of consumption by recipients of transfers and tax benefits for social welfare 
purposes) which the various national welfare systems guarantee to them3. For the elderly, we have used the net replacement 
rate relating to compulsory pension schemes, which represents the percentage of individual income, net of contributions and 
taxes, that the pension system guarantees after exiting the job market. Formally, this is the ratio of the net pension to the labour 
income net of tax. Three levels of labour income were considered: 50 percent, 100 percent and 150 percent of national average 
labour income. From a methodological point of view, we repeat the same simulation analysis to calculate the net replacement 
rate of unemployment benefits during the first year of unemployment, which represents the proportion of net labour income 
replaced by the net benefits received in the event of unemployment. The latter, in turn, depend on both labour income and the 
recipient’s family situation. Therefore, two income categories were considered (67 percent and 100 percent of national average 
labour income) and, within each of these, six types of family: three typical families (single parent, single-earner households and 
families with both partners in employment) without children and three families of the same types with two underage children.
–	 The monetary benefits for the disabled, represented by the transfer that on an average, the national governments allocate in the 
form of disability pensions or monetary transfers to pay medical expenses and for care and assistance.
–	 The Gini index calculated based on after-tax-and-transfers disposable income for income inequality.
–	 The poverty index (calculated as the percentage of households with equivalised disposable household incomes at least 60 percent 
lower than the median national income as reported in OECD Income distribution and poverty database) is considered as an 
indicator of the effectiveness of social policies aimed at ensuring a given standard of living.
So, for the seven expenditure subsectors, we totally consider eight sectoral indicators of social intervention: family, health, active 
labour market policies, old age, disabled, unemployment, poverty and income support. These indicators can be reconnected to the 
above mentioned general goals, as illustrated in FIGURE 1.
thE sociAl protEctioN pErformANcE iNdEx
The next step of the analysis consists in calculating a synthetic performance index. For this purpose, we normalize the values of each 
outcome’s indicators identified in the previous section within the group of the 22 countries considered.
Our sectoral performance index for the ith country and jth sector of social policy at time t is thus given by:
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where xi,j,t is the value of the indicator for social sector j in country i at time t, while xmin,j,t and xmax,j,t represent, respectively, the 
minimum and maximum values for the same indicator within the group of the 22 countries under consideration. Therefore, the 
3  For primary data on the net family income and the net replacement rates for elderly and unemployed, see the Appendix (Tables A2, A3, A4 and A5).
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performance index ranges between 0 and 1, and enables a comparison within the group of countries under consideration. Pi,j,t = 0 
indicates the case in which the ith country exhibits the worst performance in the jth sector at time t; conversely, Pi,j,t =1 represents the 
best outcome in the jth sector at time t for the ith country.
To ensure that the highest values of the indicator are representative of the best performances, we have used the complement 
to one of the unemployment rate (in the three measures considered), the poverty index and the Gini index. In these cases, it is in 
fact clear that higher values of the index would indicate a high gap in the unemployment rate, the poverty index and the income 
concentration index compared with the respective minimum values, indicating worse – and not better – performances for the country 
concerned.
Th e complements to one of these three outcome variables are interpretable as the employment rate, a welfare index representative 
of the percentage of households with disposable income of over 60 percent of the median disposable income, and an index of 
equidistribution of disposable income, respectively.
Fig. 1: Output Indicators for Social Policies.
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For the sectors of social expenditure associated with several outcome indicators (for example, family, the elderly, unemployment, 
labour market and redistribution), we consider their average value following the methodology used in calculating the Human 
Development Indices.4 Finally, the aggregate indicator for the whole area of the social sector was obtained by adding together the 
individual partial indicators in accordance with the existing literature (Tanzi et al. 2000, 2006). For country i at time t, we thus have:
∑
=
=
8
1
,,,
j
tjiti PSPPI
The final values are characterized by a high degree of heterogeneity within the group of countries considered, ranging from 1.96 
(Greece) to 6.34 (Norway). Higher indicators (greater than the median value 4.43) are associated with the Nordic countries (Norway, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden) and Luxembourg, Austria, France, Germany, Belgium and Slovenia.
Differently from Boeri (2002), Sapir (2005) and Caruana (2010), the Anglo-Saxon countries do not outperform the Mediterranean 
ones. As for the Eastern countries, differently from Caruana (2010), the Czech Republic and Slovenia do not outperform the Nordic 
countries, ranking with the other central countries; Hungary is slightly above and Poland below the Mediterranean countries (with 
the exception of Greece). This new evidence, besides the different period under consideration, stems from the measure of performance 
that we adopt, based on the output of a set of social policy areas that is wider than those adopted in the above-mentioned literature 
which proposes sectoral effectiveness analyses (labour market, poverty, redistribution, old age) or a more limited set of spending 
sectors. For instance, the lag of the Mediterranean countries with respect to the Anglo-Saxon countries in the area ‘unemployment’ 
is compensated by a better performance in the fields of ‘health’ (and ‘“the elderly’, as for the United Kingdom). Consequently, we 
believe that a general performance index can better assess the overall effect of social protection on social welfare.
The disaggregated analysis of the index also shows diversity in its composition among countries (FIGURE 2). Performance 
levels of the ‘family’, ‘health’, ‘unemployment’, ‘income inequality’ and ‘poverty’ sectors are higher in the Nordic countries (Norway, 
Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands) and in some continental countries, notably Luxembourg. In the Mediterranean countries, in 
contrast, the better-performing components are represented by ‘health’ and ‘the elderly’, while markedly poor performances are 
highlighted by the context indicators relating to the fight against poverty and to policies aimed at reducing income inequality. Anglo-
Saxon countries perform well in the unemployment and poverty sectors.
vAriAbility iN thE pErformANcE of thE sociAl sEctor
The performance index of the social sector is thus characterized by a certain degree of variability in the context of the European 
countries considered. What might account for such a variability in performance? Are higher levels of performance necessarily 
associated with higher levels of expenditure?
At first sight, the level of expenditure appears to be the explanatory variable. High values of the performance index (≥ 5) are 
seen in the Nordic countries, which typically have generous social policies, while markedly lower values (≤ 3) are associated with 
the Mediterranean, Eastern and Anglo-Saxon countries, which are traditionally characterized by a lower level of social expenditure. 
The correlation between total gross social expenditure (also including  private measures implemented in the social sector, which 
however have a minimal impact on national social policies, albeit higher in the Nordic countries: the highest values are observed in 
the Netherlands where private social expenditure in 2013 was 21 percent  of total social expenditure) and the performance index, in 
fact, is positive, and linear interpolation accounts for around 20 percent of the phenomenon (see FIGURE 3).
In recent years, however, several socio-economic factors have had an impact on the national social policies, modifying the level 
of expenditure in a non-uniform way. Between 2000 and 2011 public social expenditure increased, on an average, by 13.2 percent 
in relation to the GDP in the Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland and Norway) and by 35 percent in the Mediterranean countries 
(Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain), thus reducing the discrepancies, which nonetheless persisted.
This phenomenon is even more evident if we consider the net public social expenditure, that is, the social spending net not only 
of measures undertaken by the private sector but also of the fiscal measures that the government imposes on it (in three forms: direct 
4  Methodological notes available at the following link. http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/calculating-indices.
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tab. 1: The Social Protection Performance Index (2013).
family health
labour 
market
old Age Unemployment disability
income inequality 
(gini index)
poverty
final 
index 2013
country          
Austria 0,71546 0,73333 0,57357 0,78301 0,95459 0,27485 0,69231 0,71852 5,44563
belgium 0,6224 0,66667 0,77395 0,3154 0,75814 0,2922 0,79487 0,44444 4,66809
czech 
republic
0,16766 0,34667 0,67284 0,4456 0,81737 0,02246 0,84615 0,9037 4,22247
denmark 0,75796 0,62667 0,76844 0,75061 0,88648 0,67877 0,91453 0,88148 6,26494
Estonia 0,21755 0,21333 0,48165 0,35513 0,80454 0,05139 0 0 2,12361
finland 0,62046 0,72 0,58828 0,3533 0,8075 0,46712 0,84615 0,71852 5,12133
france 0,57597 0,88 0,66917 0,41993 0,72162 0,21753 0,57265 0,71111 4,76798
germany 0,60792 0,69333 0,69123 0,17665 0,97927 0,30079 0,58974 0,63704 4,67597
greece 0,1852 0,76 0,06802 0,54095 0 0,01775 0,15385 0,23704 1,96281
hungary 0,01661 0 0,53313 0,89364 0,69398 0 0,61538 0,51111 3,26386
ireland 0,34385 0,72 0,44121 0,09413 0,65647 0,06867 0,44444 0,59259 3,36137
italy 0,23254 0,94667 0,69307 0,66748 0,51234 0,09884 0,30769 0,31111 3,76974
luxembourg 0,82886 0,82667 1 0,51223 0,87858 0,79827 0,68376 0,60741 6,13577
Netherlands 0,79851 0,76 0,75925 1 0,91412 0,32221 0,69231 0,6963 5,94269
Norway 0,73652 0,81333 0,70593 0,40159 1 1 0,93162 0,75556 6,34456
poland 0,22776 0,18667 0,2923 0,24694 0,67522 0,01699 0,52137 0,48889 2,65613
portugal 0,44781 0,68 0,88242 0,45477 0,45508 0,07558 0,16239 0,3037 3,46175
slovak 
republic
0,04866 0,10667 0,64343 0,72555 0,53998 0,0405 0,78632 0,76296 3,65407
slovenia 0,55499 0,62667 0,8622 0,29279 0,73445 0,02904 0,90598 0,62222 4,62833
spain 0,30206 1 0,69307 0,61064 0,08687 0,0932 0,12821 0,08889 3,00292
sweden 0,78848 0,84 0,44305 0,35147 0,76703 0,55008 0,68376 0,54815 4,97201
United 
Kingdom
0,56318 0,72 0 0 0,80849 0,10657 0,02564 0,4963 2,72018
 
Source: Our elaborations on OECD (SOCX Database) and Eurostat (Social Protection Database) data.
Fig. 2: Composition of the Social Protection Performance Index by sector (2013).
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FIGURE 3: Total Gross Social Expenditure/GDP and Social Protection Performance Index (2013) 
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taxation of income resulting from social transfers, indirect taxation on consumption by recipients of transfers, and tax benefits for 
social welfare purposes).
In the Nordic countries (Finland, Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden), fiscal measures (taxation net of tax benefits 
granted) reduce the gross social expenditure by around 20 percent. More limited measures characterize the other countries.
The result is a reduced variability in net levels of expenditure (from 18.2 for total gross expenditure to 9.3 for net public 
expenditure) and a re-ranking of countries, mainly placing all Nordic countries (except for Norway) and a few continental ones 
(Austria and Luxembourg) in lower positions. By comparing the performance indicator with net social expenditure in relation to 
GDP (FIGURE 4), a high level of variability of the index emerges corresponding to the given levels of expenditure, as does the 
absence of a clear general trend, while clearer correlations can be observed within the subgroups of countries.
FIGURE 4 shows that most of the countries considered rank between the first and the third quartile of the net public social 
expenditure (with values, respectively, of 23.5 and 19.7), while exhibiting an extremely high degree of heterogeneity in terms of the 
performance index, as, for example, in the cases of Spain, Portugal, Greece, Germany and Denmark. This variability in performance 
does not appear to be attributable to private social expenditure. In Denmark, it accounts for around 5 percent of total social 
expenditure, while in Mediterranean countries as well as in Germany private involvement in the social sector is much lower.
We may investigate the relationship that exists between the two variables considered (performance index and net public social 
expenditure/GDP) by classifying the countries into subgroups distinguished by different levels of performance. What emerges is that, 
for the countries lying at the extremes of the distribution according to the performance index (namely the Mediterranean and the 
Nordic countries respectively  belonging to the first quartile and to the interquartile difference Q4-Q3), there is not a strong positive 
correlation with expenditure.
Considering the countries placed between the third and the first quartile of the index (with corresponding values of 3.26 and 
5.12), a positive correlation (with a value of 0.56) exists between the net public expenditure and the performance of the social sector 
(FIGURE 5).
In contrast, the correlation between expenditure and performance is markedly clearer (0.84) if we consider the cluster of Eastern 
countries, characterized by a level of net social public expenditure with respect to GDP lower than the average value (20.9). For this 
set of countries, differences in performance levels seem to be associated with expenditure levels (FIGURE 6)
Fig. 3: Total Gross Social Expenditure/GDP and Social Protection Performance Index (2013).
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Fig. 4: The Social Performance Protection Index and Net Public Social Expenditure (2013).FIGURE 4: The Social Performance Protection Index and Net Public Social Expenditure (2013) 
 
Source: Our elaborations on OECD (SOCX Database) and Eurostat (Social Protection Database) data. 
 
FIGURE 5: Social Protection Performance Index and Net Public Social Expenditure. 
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Fig. 6: Social Protection Performance Index and Net Social Public Expenditure. Eastern countries (2013).
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TABLE 2: Social expenditure by goal (year 2013) 
  
 
  %Gross Social 
Public Expenditure 
Income 
concentration 
Support for vulnerable 
groups Standard of living 
Austria 
0,415871 0,542763 0,041366 
 
Belgium 
0,446187 0,508832 0,04498 
 
Czech Republic 
0,435319 0,522185 0,042495 
 
Denmark 
0,541717 0,387497 0,070786 
 
Finland 
0,425887 0,523268 0,050845 
 
France 
0,403169 0,538786 0,058045 
 
Germany 
0,461669 0,503191 0,03514 
 
Ireland 
0,481882 0,46201 0,056108 
 
Italy 
0,332541 0,637583 0,029875 
 
Netherlands 
0,544255 0,379781 0,075965 
 
Norway 
0,575327 0,382449 0,042224 
 
Portugal 
0,334706 0,648155 0,017139 
 
Slovak Republic 
0,483621 0,485721 0,030658 
 
Estonia 
Poland 
Slovak Republic 
Czech Republic 
Slovenia 
Hungary 
y = 0,3111x - 2,0034 
R² = 0,7088 
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Source: Our elaborations on OECD (SOCX Database) and Eurostat (Social Protection Database) data.
tab. 2: Social expenditure by goal (year 2013).
%gross social public Expenditure income concentration support for vulnerable groups standard of living
Austria 0,415871 0,542763 0,041366
Belgium 0,446187 0,508832 0,04498
Czech Republic 0,435319 0,522185 0,042495
Denmark 0,541717 0,387497 0,070786
Finland 0,425887 0,523268 0,050845
France 0,403169 0,538786 0,058045
Germany 0,461669 0,503191 0,03514
Ireland 0,481882 0,462 1 0,056108
Italy 0,332541 0,637583 0,029875
Netherlands 0,544255 0,379781 0,075965
Norway 0,575327 0,382449 0,042224
Portugal 0,334706 0,648155 0,017139
Slovak Republic 0,483621 0,485721 0,030658
Spain 0,369254 0,604262 0,026484
Sweden 0,547214 0,407507 0,045279
United Kingdom 0,516961 0,27695 0,206089
Source: Our elaboration of OECD data (SOCX database).
For Standard of living: social expenditure for the following programs: old age (other cash benefits), family (other cash benefits), housing, other 
social policy areas.
For Support for vulnerable groups social expenditure for the following programs:  old age (pensions, early retirement pensions), survivors 
(pensions, other cash benefits), incapacity related (pensions and paid sick leave for occupational injury and desease), family (maternity and 
parental leave), active labour market, unemployment).
For income concentration social expenditure for the following programs: old age (residential care/home help services, other benefits in kind), 
survivors (other benefits in kind), incapacity related (disability pensions, other cash benefits, residential care/home help services, rehabilitation 
services, other benefits in kind), family (allowances, early childhood education and care, home care/accommodation, other benefits in kind).
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Nevertheless, the overall correlation between performance and total social expenditure appears rather low; however, differences 
in performance levels can be associated with another feature of the welfare systems.
As mentioned above, the welfare policies can be referred to three general goals: maintenance of a certain standard of living; income 
support for vulnerable groups; and reducing income concentration.  We have thus tested whether the social expenditure’s composition 
by this “three goals classification” may explain performance differences. To do this, we have grouped the previous sub-sectors into three 
main expenditure’s macro-sectors corresponding to the three main objectives of the welfare policies. In practice, it is difficult to assign 
each item of expenditure to one single goal, as instruments may target more than one of them at the same time. Therefore, we have 
partitioned social expenditure according to its main goal for the European countries under consideration (TABLE 2).
 The data indicate that the main objective relates to income support for vulnerable groups in Austria, Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The reduction of income concentration prevails in Denmark, Iceland, 
the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden (countries traditionally characterized by a low level of income concentration), while in Ireland 
and the UK, the fight against social exclusion is relatively more important, exceeding 10 percent of the overall expenditure.
Then, we have implemented a cluster analysis using the composition of expenditure by the three goals (standard of living; income 
support and reducing income concentration). Variables are scaled by their standard deviation; the Euclidean measurement of distance 
is used, while the aggregation method adopted is the average link method. The result is that countries can be divided into five groups: 
the first one comprises the UK on its own; the second Denmark, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands and Ireland; the third the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia; the fourth Austria, Germany, Belgium, Finland and France; and the fifth Italy, Spain and Portugal. This 
grouping of countries corresponds to the traditional classification of welfare systems; the only exceptions are Austria, that belongs 
to the central group but displays a level of the performance index similar to the Nordic countries, and Ireland, which belongs to the 
Nordic group though displaying a low performance level (Ireland is, however, a sort of outlier, on the ‘edge’ of the group of central 
European countries). This grouping of countries also fits the ranking obtained according to the performance index (Antonelli and 
De Bonis 2016).
In particular, countries with a higher performance index are characterized by a higher share of expenditure aimed at reducing 
income concentration. In fact, the Nordic countries are characterized by higher levels of both the index and the share of social 
spending aimed at reducing income concentration, the central European countries by intermediate levels, and the southern European 
countries and the UK by low levels.
coNclUsioNs
We have measured the effectiveness of the European social policies through a newly developed performance index, based on the 
output of all the main sectors of social policy; this results in a different ranking of countries with respect to those found in the existing 
literature.
The paper also shows that the variability of national performances is high and that this cannot be explained only by expenditure 
levels. Essentially similar levels of net social expenditure are often accompanied by a high degree of variability in performance – 
compare, for instance, Greece, Portugal, Austria and Denmark. Furthermore, this variability of performance does not appear to be 
attributable to private intervention in the social sector, which is in any case limited compared with public policies in all countries. 
In the paper, we propose an avenue for future research: considering the composition of social expenditure as a determinant of its 
performance. Actually, the performance of European countries seems to relate to both quantitative and qualitative dimensions of 
public intervention: countries with a high public social expenditure/GDP ratio achieve a high performance index if the share of 
spending destined to reduce inequality in income distribution is high.
As a policy implication for countries with low levels of social spending, the paper suggests a modification of the composition of 
social expenditure rather than a tout-court expansionary policy.
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AppENdix
tab. A1: Source of data.
variables source of data
Maternal Employment OECD Family database
Net Disposable Family Income OECD Tax-Benefits Calculator Model
Life Expectancy OECD Family database
Unemployment Rates OECD Labour Market Statistics
Net Replacement Rate for the elderly OECD Pensions Statistics database
Net Replacement Rate for the unemployed OECD Benefits and Wages Statistics
Monetary Benefits for disabled Eurostat Social Protection database
Gini Index OECD Income Distribution and Poverty database
Poverty OECD Income Distribution and Poverty database
tab. A2: Net Family Income (2013).
countries Net family income in ppp (Us dollars) 2013
Austria 64998,75
Belgium 62648,28
Czech Republic 32836,91
Denmark 58836,54
Estonia 30900,19
Finland 59222,34
France 57993,89
Germany 66490,35
Greece 49334,96
Hungary 29814,12
Ireland 60947,56
Italy 50506,70
Luxembourg 84729,00
Netherlands 71318,07
Norway 72517,29
Poland 29406,64
Portugal 39433,96
Slovak Republic 28512,05
Slovenia 37712,85
Spain 52286,35
Sweden 60947,32
United Kingdom 68063,40
Source: elaboration on OECD tax-benefit calculator data
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tab. A3: Net Replacement Rate for Pensions (2013).
 Net replacement rate for pensions (2013)
 low earner (0,5 Aw) Average earner (Aw) high earner (1,5 Aw)
Austria 91,2 90,2 86,2
Belgium 80,7 62,1 48,3
Czech Republic 97,8 63,8 50,8
Denmark 117,5 77,4 67,4
Estonia 79,7 62,4 55,5
Finland 71,3 62,8 63,2
France 75,9 71,4 60,9
Germany 55,2 57,1 56,1
Greece 92,5 70,5 65
Hungary 94,4 95,2 96,1
Ireland 75,5 44,8 34,6
Italy 83,9 81,5 83,3
Luxembourg 87,1 69,4 66,8
Netherlands 104,8 101,1 97,2
Norway 91,1 62,8 51,3
Poland 61,3 59,5 59,1
Portugal 77,7 67,8 68,4
Slovak Republic 88,1 85,4 84,7
Slovenia 63,5 63,3 60,6
Spain 79,5 80,1 79,8
Sweden 68,8 55,3 72,9
United Kingdom 67,2 41,8 30,5
Source: Pensions at a Glance, OECD Pensions Statistics (database)
tab. A4: Net replacement rates unemployed: case 1 (67% AW) (2013).
 67% of Average wage (Aw)
 No children 2 children
countries single person
one-earner 
married couple
two-earner 
married couple
lone parents 
one-earner 
married couple
two-earner 
married couple
Austria 55 57 80 71 72 85
Belgium 90 83 84 95 82 85
Czech 
Republic
65 65 87 67 67 88
Denmark 84 85 92 89 87 92
Estonia 55 57 77 65 62 79
Finland 59 59 80 74 69 84
France 69 65 84 71 68 84
Germany 59 59 86 81 83 90
Greece 39 40 68 46 46 70
Hungary 68 68 84 76 76 87
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 67% of Average wage (Aw)
 No children 2 children
countries single person
one-earner 
married couple
two-earner 
married couple
lone parents 
one-earner 
married couple
two-earner 
married couple
Ireland 50 80 75 50 75 81
Italy 72 76 86 81 78 88
Luxembourg 83 81 90 90 89 93
Netherlands 76 77 84 67 81 77
Norway 68 69 84 79 73 86
Poland 49 50 75 80 56 76
Portugal 75 75 93 79 78 94
Slovak 
Republic
62 58 85 72 57 86
Slovenia 86 83 93 85 88 96
Spain 78 75 89 76 74 88
Sweden 63 63 81 71 67 83
United 
Kingdom
20 31 60 47 56 67
Source: OECD Benefits and wages statistics http://www.oecd.org/els/benefits-and-wages-statistics.htm
continuedtab. A4: Net replacement rates unemployed: case 1 (67% AW) (2013).
tab. A5: Net replacement rates unemployed: case 2 (100% AW) (2013).
 100% of Average wage (Aw)
 No children 2 children
countries
single 
person
one-earner 
married couple
two-earner 
married couple
lone 
parents 
one-earner 
married couple
two-earner 
married couple
Austria 55 56 76 67 68 81
Belgium 67 63 71 74 64 74
Czech Republic 65 65 83 70 66 89
Denmark 58 60 75 67 64 76
Estonia 54 56 73 60 61 74
Finland 58 58 76 70 65 79
France 67 67 80 71 68 81
Germany 59 59 83 71 69 88
Greece 28 28 57 33 34 59
Hungary 45 45 67 57 56 72
Ireland 36 57 63 48 67 69
Italy 57 60 75 69 69 77
Luxembourg 85 82 88 93 89 92
Netherlands 75 77 83 68 81 78
Norway 65 66 79 76 69 81
Poland 33 35 60 53 41 62
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 100% of Average wage (Aw)
 No children 2 children
countries
single 
person
one-earner 
married couple
two-earner 
married couple
lone 
parents 
one-earner 
married couple
two-earner 
married couple
Portugal 75 75 95 77 77 98
Slovak Republic 65 59 82 93 58 84
Slovenia 68 67 81 77 72 84
Spain 56 56 74 70 70 82
Sweden 44 44 67 53 48 68
United Kingdom 14 22 50 40 48 56
Source: OECD Benefits and wages statistics http://www.oecd.org/els/benefits-and-wages-statistics.htm.
continuedtab. A5: Net replacement rates unemployed: case 2 (100% AW) (2013).
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